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KUCANA V. HOLDER AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
THE DECISION NOT TO REOPEN SUA SPONTE IN 
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Michael A. Keough*
 
 
Motions to reopen allow aliens facing removal to have their case 
reexamined by the Board of Immigration Appeals in light of new evidence 
or intervening events, and are an important procedural safeguard in 
immigration removal proceedings.  Parties may move to reopen, and the 
Board may also reopen removal proceedings under its sua sponte authority. 
Although federal courts of appeals may review final removal decisions, the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) severely curtailed the ability of federal courts to review final 
removal decisions.  Prior to 2010, circuits were split on the issue of 
whether motions to reopen were reviewable by federal courts in light of 
IIRIRA. 
In Kucana v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a decision to 
reopen made pursuant to a party’s motion was reviewable since the 
discretion to grant or deny such a motion had derived from a regulation 
promulgated by the Attorney General.  The Court held that the Executive 
could not use regulations alone to change the ability of the federal courts to 
review their decisions, but bracketed the issue of whether the decision not 
to reopen sua sponte could be reviewed under this same logic.  Following 
the Court’s decision in 2010, the courts of appeals are divided over whether 
such decisions are reviewable; some circuits have determined that they lack 
jurisdiction based on pre-Kucana case law, while others have urged a 
reconsideration of pre-Kucana decisions in light of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning. 
This Note argues that the decision not to reopen sua sponte should be 
subject to judicial review under the same reasoning applied in Kucana.  
Review of these decisions would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s 
movement toward greater judicial review of federal immigration decisions. 
 
 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2010, Herbert H. 
Lehman College—City University of New York; B.A., 2008, The George Washington 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Joseph Landau for his guidance and inspiration, 
and Lauren for her support during the long hours that went into this Note. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Samuel Adebisi Awe came to the United States from Nigeria in 1969 on 
a student visa, eventually earning a Ph.D. in agriculture from the University 
of Wisconsin.1  Awe returned to Nigeria in 1994 to serve as that country’s 
Commissioner of Agriculture and Rural Development but, having been 
plagued by kidney disease all of his life, returned to the United States to 
receive medical care.2  Awe began working as a teacher in Milwaukee and 
applied for asylum in 1998, but did not have the proper visa to remain in the 
United States and was ordered removed after his asylum claim was denied.3  
Awe’s removal order was temporarily delayed so that he could continue to 
receive life-saving treatment in the United States.4
Awe filed a motion to reopen his case based on his medical condition, 
fear that he would be persecuted for his service in the Nigerian government, 
and fear that his daughter would be subjected to genital mutilation upon 
their return.
 
5  When this motion failed before the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA), Awe appealed to the Seventh Circuit.6  The court, bound by 
precedent holding that denials of motions to reopen were unreviewable, 
determined that it had no choice but to affirm the removal order.7  The 
circuit opinion concluded with a humanitarian plea, calling on the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to grant a “deferred action” 
so that Awe could remain in the United States and receive care.8  Without 
any authority to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen, the Seventh 
Circuit could only hope that the “exceptional humanitarian concerns” 
present in Awe’s case would inspire the USCIS to act.9
If circuit courts had the power to review the BIA’s decision not to use its 
sua sponte power to reopen, the Seventh Circuit would not have been 
powerless to do justice in Awe’s case.  Immigrants like Samuel Awe, who 
are trying to start a new life in America or flee persecution abroad, face 
serious consequences, such as forced removal from the U.S. and separation 
from their families, when they do not prevail in their removal 
proceedings.
 
10
 
 1. See Awe v. Holder, 340 F. App’x 341, 343 (7th Cir. 2009). 
  At the end of a removal proceeding, if new facts come to 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 343–44. 
 5. See id. at 344. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 346. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Robert A. Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono Commitment 
to the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2009) (noting the dire 
consequences of removal for immigrants). 
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light or a change in the law occurs that would have altered the outcome of 
the case, an alien11 may file a motion to reopen the case.12  The agency has 
the discretion to grant or deny the motion.13  Prior to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder,14 circuit courts disagreed over 
whether the BIA’s decision to reopen was discretionary under the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199615 (IIRIRA), 
and thus unreviewable by federal courts as part of that law’s jurisdiction-
stripping provisions, or made discretionary by regulation, and thus subject 
to review.16
Kucana settled this question by holding that decisions made discretionary 
by statutes were not subject to judicial review where IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-
stripping provisions applied, but those made discretionary solely through a 
regulation were subject to review.
 
17  Some discretion, such as the BIA’s 
ability to admit an alien despite criminal convictions that would otherwise 
render her inadmissible, is granted by Congress through statute and can be 
placed beyond the purview of the courts if Congress so desires.18  Other 
discretion, such as the regulation defining the power to reopen, which was 
at issue in Kucana, is created by regulations of the Attorney General and 
cannot be removed from the jurisdiction of the courts.19  In Kucana, the 
Court noted that Congress has the authority to limit judicial review through 
appropriate legislation, but allowing regulations to affect judicial review 
gives the Executive Branch an unconstitutional power to limit review of its 
own decisions.20
The Court did not answer the question of whether a decision not to 
reopen sua sponte could be subject to judicial review.
 
21  The BIA exercises 
its sua sponte power when it reopens a case on its own motion.22
 
 11. The word “alien,” although it is the legal term used to describe persons located 
within the United States who have not yet been naturalized, has also been used in a 
pejorative context against immigrants seeking to enter the United States.  Title 8 of the U.S. 
Code defines “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006).  The term is used within this Note solely to describe a legal status. 
  In the 
wake of Kucana, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have affirmed pre-Kucana case law and held that they do 
 12. See 18B JILL GUSTAFSON ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 45:1631 
(Francis M. Dougherty ed., 2009); see also In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 74 (B.I.A. 
1998) (reopening sua sponte where new statutory definition of alien’s status was enacted 
after the initial BIA decision). 
 13. See 18A GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 12, § 45:1193. 
 14. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). 
 15. Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 16. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 827–28. 
 17. See id. at 839–40. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Cf. id. at 831. 
 22. 5 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.03(4)(b) 
(2011). 
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not have jurisdiction over sua sponte motions to reopen.23  Panels in the 
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have urged revisiting and potentially 
overturning pre-Kucana cases in light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, or 
have suggested new standards by which these decisions can be reviewed.24
Part I of this Note outlines U.S. immigration law and the role of motions 
to reopen in removal proceedings.  In Part II, this Note considers the state 
of the law after Kucana.  Finally, Part III argues that the Supreme Court 
should allow judicial review of the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte, 
and that allowing this review is in line with the Court’s broad trend toward 
permitting judicial review of agency decisions in the immigration realm. 
  
Whether the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte can be reviewed by a 
federal court is the focus of this Note. 
I.  REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
AND IIRIRA 
Part I discusses motions to reopen within the context of removal 
proceedings before the BIA.  It also places the Kucana decision in the 
historical context of judicial review of federal immigration decisions, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century with the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
the announcement of the plenary powers doctrine.  Finally, Part I outlines 
the passage of IIRIRA, which led to the question of jurisdiction at issue in 
Kucana.   
A.  Removal Proceedings and the Board of Immigration Appeals 
1.  Removal Procedure 
Removal proceedings25 begin with service of a Notice to Appear 
(NTA).26  The NTA contains a notice of the alien’s rights and the charges 
to which he or she must respond, as well as a brief statement of the 
government’s reasons for bringing the action.27
 
 23. See, e.g., Bakanovas v. Holder, 438 F. App’x 717, 722 (10th Cir. 2011); Bustillo-
Martinez v. Holder, 431 F. App’x 265, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2011); Ozeiry v. Att’y Gen., 400 F. 
App’x 647, 649–50 (3d Cir. 2010); Gashi v. Holder, 382 F. App’x 21, 22–23 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549–50 
(8th Cir. 2010); ; Jaimes-Aguirre v. Att’y Gen., 369 F. App’x 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2010); see 
also infra Part II.A. 
  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) must also then decide whether the alien will be 
detained during the period of the removal proceeding, which can last 
 24. See, e.g., Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2011); Mejia-
Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2011); Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 
190 (6th Cir. 2010); see also infra Part II.B. 
 25. Under IIRIRA, what were formerly known as “deportation” proceedings and 
“exclusion” proceedings are now collectively known as “removal” proceedings. See 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND 
POLICY 648 (5th ed. 2009). 
 26. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 650. 
 27. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 40–41 (2d ed. 2009). 
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anywhere from a few months to many years.28  Although aliens in removal 
proceedings have a right to representation by counsel if they choose, they 
do not have the right to have an attorney provided to them if they cannot 
afford one.29
An Immigration Judge (IJ) presides over the removal proceeding.
 
30  
Removal proceedings may take place in person or via videoconference, and 
are open to the public at the discretion of the IJ.31  At the beginning of the 
proceeding, the IJ must determine if the alien is aware of his or her right to 
be represented by counsel.32  After this, the alien must admit or deny the 
facts of the allegations against him or her.33  If he or she admits the 
allegations, the hearing is complete and the IJ can order removal.34  If the 
alien denies the allegations, the IJ conducts an evidentiary hearing to 
establish the facts underlying the charges.35  At the end of the hearing, the 
IJ determines whether the alien is removable based solely on the facts 
established in the hearing.36
2.  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
The alien has the right to appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA 
acts on behalf of the Attorney General as the highest administrative court 
for immigration and nationality matters.37  The Board has jurisdiction over 
all decisions of immigration courts and certain other decisions of the 
DHS.38  The fifteen members of the BIA sit in Falls Church, Virginia, and 
are appointed by the Attorney General.39
 
 28. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 
  The BIA is part of the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, which reports directly to the Attorney 
25, at 651. 
 29. Id. at 654.  Whether ineffective assistance of counsel can be grounds for a motion to 
reopen has been the subject of disagreement among Attorneys General.  In 2009, Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey held that ineffective assistance of counsel was not grounds for a 
motion to reopen because there is no constitutional right to counsel in immigration cases. See 
In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 720–21 (A.G.), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009); 
1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 4.01.  His successor, Eric Holder, vacated this decision, 
giving the BIA discretion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and the 
Department of Justice solicited public comment for new regulations on ineffective assistance 
of counsel as grounds for a motion to reopen. See Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2–3; 1 
GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 4.01(4). 
 30. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 654. 
 31. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS:  A 
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:5.3 (2011). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE 
MANUAL 1 (2004) [hereinafter BIA PRACTICE MANUAL], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/tocfull.pdf. 
 38. Id. at 1–2. 
 39. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2011); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 657. 
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General.40  Since the BIA and IJs are part of the Justice Department, DHS 
must appear as a party to bring claims before an IJ or the Board.41
The BIA reviews factual findings of the IJ under a clearly erroneous 
standard.
 
42  Questions of law are reviewed de novo.43  Cases brought before 
the BIA are first evaluated by a screening panel, which refers them either to 
a single Board member or to a three-member panel.44  The single Board 
member may issue a two-sentence “affirmance without opinion,” or write 
an order that includes a more detailed explanation of the ruling.45  Three-
member panels consider cases to correct inconsistencies among rulings of 
different IJs, establish precedent for a rule or statute, review a decision of 
an IJ that lacks conformity with precedent, correct clearly erroneous factual 
determinations of an IJ, or review any other case that would be 
inappropriate for a single Board member to review.46  If a case is referred to 
a panel of three Board members, the panel will issue a formal written 
decision that becomes the final order of the BIA in that case.47
Although the Department of Justice has developed procedures to ensure 
uniform application of immigration laws, circuit courts have expressed 
doubt about the quality of justice administered by the BIA and IJs.  In 
Benslimane v. Gonzales,
 
48 the Seventh Circuit criticized the actions of the 
BIA as falling “below the minimum standards of legal justice.”49  The 
Seventh Circuit also noted that when corrections must be made, the cases 
are returned to the Attorney General, the party who was initially responsible 
for the inadequate proceedings.50  Since many IJ decisions are now 
affirmed by a single Board member without any formal opinion, circuit 
court frustration sometimes extends to failed processes at the IJ level.51  In 
one case, the Second Circuit went so far as to remand to “an IJ other than IJ 
Chase” and encouraged the Board to reexamine sua sponte all of that IJ’s 
recent decisions.52
 
 40. BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 
  In light of these criticisms, in 2006, Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales announced twenty-two procedures aimed at increasing the 
37, at 2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.05(6)(b)(i). 
 46. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 49. See id. at 830.  The Seventh Circuit noted that it was unclear whether this was 
caused by budget constraints or by another factor outside of the BIA’s control. See id.; see 
also Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench:  An Ethical Perspective, 28 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 471, 474 (2008) (arguing that poor judicial ethics was the 
root cause of the crisis). 
 50. See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830. 
 51. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 748. 
 52. See Ba v. Gonzales, 228 F. App’x 7, 11 (2d Cir. 2007).  The court noted that IJ 
Chase’s language and demeanor had “erode[d] the appearance of fairness and call[ed] into 
question the results of the proceeding. Id. at 11; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra 
note 25, at 748. 
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effectiveness and integrity of BIA decisions, including the use of 
affirmances without opinion and strict time limits for BIA decisions.53
Criticism did not end with the addition of these procedures, however.  
The reduction of size from twenty-three Board members to eleven in 2002 
resulted in the reassignment of many Board members that had routinely 
ruled in favor of aliens seeking to avoid deportation without any criteria for 
selecting which Board members would be reassigned.
   
54  Some scholars 
have argued that this “purge of the liberals” undermines the idea that the 
BIA is insulated from political pressure.55  Others have noted that outside 
pressures, such as conflicting or unclear laws and the lack of robust judicial 
review of BIA decisions, and not political meddling, have created the 
“immigration adjudication crisis.”56
3.  Motions to Reopen 
 
A motion to reopen allows an alien, on behalf of herself, or the Attorney 
General, on behalf of the U.S. government, to challenge a decision of the 
BIA.57  If, after a final removal order, new evidence is discovered or 
intervening events occur (such as an event in the alien’s home country or a 
change in U.S. law), a party to the removal may move to reopen the 
proceedings so that the BIA can reconsider the case and take into account 
the new evidence.58  A motion to reopen must be made within ninety days 
of the BIA’s decision; otherwise, the party bringing the motion must show 
that the delay was “reasonable and . . . beyond the control of the applicant 
or petitioner.”59  When the BIA considers the motion, the alien must 
provide affidavits showing a prima facie case for the relief sought, or else 
the motion to reopen will be denied.60  These motions may be appealed to 
the circuit courts,61 which were split on the scope of that review prior to the 
Kucana decision.62
When the Board decides to reopen a case where the formal requirements 
of a motion to reopen have not been met, it does so through its sua sponte 
 
 
 53. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra 
note 25, at 748–49. 
 54. See id. at 750–51; Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on 
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 376 (2006) (citing Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of 
Quasi-judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. 
BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004)).  The BIA was increased to its current fifteen-member size 
through a 2006 interim rule that was finalized in 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 33,875 (2008); 71 
Fed. Reg. 70,885 (2006). 
 55. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 751. 
 56. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence:  Uncovering Contributors 
to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2011). 
 57. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 12, § 45:1631. 
 58. BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 164. 
 59. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) (2011); see also BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 164–65. 
 60. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 165 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 
94, 104 (1988)). 
 61. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 62. See infra Part I.E. 
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power to reopen matters before it.63  Pursuant to regulations promulgated 
by the Attorney General, the BIA may use its sua sponte power in 
“exceptional situations,” but may not use the power as “a general cure for 
filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing 
them might result in hardship.”64  For example, when new information or a 
change in law occurs after the ninety-day window for filing the motion has 
elapsed, the requirements for the motion have not been met.65  In this 
situation, however, the BIA would be able to reopen sua sponte even 
though a party would be precluded from moving to reopen.66  The 
Department of Justice has cited sua sponte reopening as a comparable 
stand-in for a range of remedies.  For example, following public comment 
on a related rule, the Department declined to adopt a proposed “good cause 
exception” for those cases that “[fell] beyond [the] rule’s time and number 
limitations,” noting that the ability to reopen sua sponte provides a 
comparable procedural remedy in these situations.67
The BIA has broad discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen 
proceedings under its sua sponte authority, just as it has broad discretion to 
grant or deny motions to reopen when the motion is made by the parties.
 
68  
Two cases illustrate the breadth of the BIA’s discretion to exercise sua 
sponte authority to reopen.  In In re X-G-W-,69 the BIA exercised its sua 
sponte authority when the statutory definition of “refugee” was changed to 
arguably include an alien whose situation was not contemplated under the 
prior definition, even though the alien’s own motion to reopen was 
untimely.70  This change in the law represented an “exceptional situation” 
warranting reopening; upon reopening, the BIA withheld removal.71  In 
contrast, the BIA declined to exercise sua sponte jurisdiction in In re 
G-D-.72  There, an alien claimed that the Board’s intervening decision in In 
re O-Z- & I-Z-,73 in which it found that a Ukrainian had a well-founded fear 
of persecution in Ukraine based on past religious persecution,74
 
 63. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also BOSWELL, supra note 
 required 
27, at 166. 
 64. In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A. 1997). 
 65. See 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.05. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration 
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,902 (Apr. 29, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2). 
 68. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Anne J. Greer & Teresa L. Donovan, Immigration Law in 
Motion—The Changing Landscape of Motions for Continuance, Change of Venue, 
Reopening, Remand, and Reconsideration Before the Immigration Judges, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, and the Federal Circuit Courts, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 2007, at 1. 
 69. 22 I. & N. Dec. 71 (B.I.A. 1998), overruled by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359 
(B.I.A. 2002). 
 70. See id. at 74.  The BIA’s policy of granting untimely motions for refugee status 
based solely on coercive population control policies, first espoused in In re X-G-W-, was 
abandoned in 2002. See In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 359.  For an example of a sua 
sponte reopening that is still good law (although unpublished and not precedential), see 
generally In re Cuares-Tito, No. A098 966 923, 2011 WL 3443890 (B.I.A. July 8, 2011) 
(reopening sua sponte where an IJ followed improper procedures in denying a motion). 
 71. See In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 74. 
 72. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132 (B.I.A. 1999). 
 73. 22 I. & N. Dec. 23 (B.I.A. 1998). 
 74. See In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 27. 
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reopening despite G-D-’s untimely motion.75  The Board held that the 
decision in O-Z- & I-Z- was an application of existing law to the specific 
facts of that case and not a fundamental intervening change in immigration 
law that would require the Board to reopen G-D-’s case under its own 
authority.76
B.  Judicial Power in the Executive and the Courts 
 
Kucana’s complex questions about discretion arise from Congress’s 
ability to give judicial powers to the Executive and to limit the 
circumstances under which courts can review those decisions.  Although 
Article III vests the “judicial power” in the Supreme Court, Congress may 
create executive tribunals, such as the BIA, that have the authority to 
exercise judicial power.  Congress may also limit the ability of federal 
courts to review the decisions of these executive tribunals. 
1.  When Congress Can Delegate Authority to an Agency 
The Constitution does not give the judicial branch a “monopoly” over the 
power of adjudication.77  In order to ensure effective administration of the 
law, Congress may grant to the Executive the power to form tribunals that 
have the power to adjudicate disputes.78  The Supreme Court, in Crowell v. 
Benson,79 rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative 
hearings to determine admiralty compensation claims, and permitted 
Congress to place adjudicatory power in the hands of the Executive.80  This 
power can be wielded by both administrative agencies and “Article I 
courts,” executive tribunals given judicial power through acts of 
Congress.81
 
 75. See id. at 1132–33. 
  Congress can grant administrative tribunals discretionary 
 76. See id. at 1135–36. 
 77. Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1969 (2000). But see Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (noting that Congress must vest the “whole judicial power” in the 
federal courts); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:  A 
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 749–50 
(1984) (arguing that Article III vests mandatory jurisdiction for every claim in some federal 
court). 
 78. Neuman, supra note 77, at 1969.  Article III courts typically have greater power over 
“private rights” disputes between two individuals, whereas noncriminal “public rights” 
disputes between an individual and the government can be adjudicated by executive 
tribunals. Id. at 1969–70 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–52 (1932)). 
 79. 285 U.S. 22. 
 80. See id. at 64–65; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:  An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1374–79 
(1953). 
 81. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 339 (6th ed. 2009). 
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powers by statute,82 or such tribunals may acquire their powers by 
executive regulation.83
Although giving adjudicatory power to the relevant agency may make for 
more efficient administration of the law, the act of granting judicial power 
to the Executive rightly raises separation of powers concerns, since 
executive agencies may be performing judicial functions without the 
oversight of the judicial branch.
 
84  One method of easing this tension 
between efficiency and separation of powers is to allow courts to review the 
decisions of these executive tribunals.85
2.  When Congress Can Limit Jurisdiction of Article III Courts 
 
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress cannot change the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but does have the power to limit 
the appellate jurisdiction of Article III courts.86  The “Madisonian 
Compromise” gave Congress the power to determine the jurisdiction of 
lower federal courts.87  In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co.,88 the Supreme Court 
affirmed the principle that Congress is permitted to limit the jurisdiction of 
Article III courts to hear certain types of cases.89  The Lauf Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which 
prevented federal courts from hearing claims related to “yellow dog” 
contracts, agreements that prohibited employees from unionizing as a 
condition of employment.90  More recently, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,91 
the Court upheld Congress’s power to prevent federal courts from 
exercising diversity jurisdiction in cases involving “domestic relations.”92
 
 82. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (granting discretion to the Attorney General 
to cancel the removal of a permanent resident who has not been convicted of an aggravated 
felony). 
  
 83. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (granting the BIA discretion to reopen a 
removal proceeding, through a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General). 
 84. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and 
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 938 (1988) (“The underlying constitutional conception is 
that wielders of governmental power must be subject to the limits of law, and that the 
applicable limits should be determined, not by those institutions whose authority is in 
question, but by an impartial judiciary.”). 
 85. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 1969–70. 
 86. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1868) (holding that when 
Congress removes jurisdiction from the federal courts through statute, the Supreme Court is 
prevented from hearing a related claim); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–
76 (1803) (holding that Congress cannot alter the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
 87. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 288. 
 88. 303 U.S. 323 (1938). 
 89. See id. at 330. 
 90. See id. at 325–27; FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 292–93. 
 91. 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
 92. See id. at 697–702; FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 294.  A separate controversy 
exists over whether Article III courts can be denied jurisdiction over a particular claim if 
state courts are unable to hear that claim. See id. at 290–92.  Because the power to remove is 
vested solely in the federal government, however, this Note will not address the availability 
of relief through state courts. 
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The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA were another example of 
Congress’s power to alter the jurisdiction of Article III courts.93
C.  Immigration Policy in the United States and the Rise and Fall 
of the Plenary Power Doctrine 
 
The decision in Kucana was made against the background of more than 
100 years of Supreme Court immigration jurisprudence.  This section first 
discusses the plenary power doctrine and the great deference that courts 
have shown the Executive in immigration matters.  It then discuss the more 
recent trend of finding room within this doctrine for judicial review of some 
immigration decisions. 
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate 
immigration matters,94 American immigration regulations mostly originated 
at the state and local level until after the Civil War.95  Early American 
immigration policy has been described as “immigration as a transition,” 
because prevailing attitudes assumed that all immigrants would become 
naturalized citizens and that the status of being a new immigrant was 
merely a stepping-stone to inevitable naturalization.96  This attitude 
changed in the late nineteenth century, as the demographics and size of the 
immigrant population increased; once permissive views of immigration 
changed as well.97  As a response, the Page Act98 became the first modern 
immigration law in 1875, restricting entry of Chinese women under the 
pretense of regulating prostitution.99  The Chinese Exclusion Act followed 
in 1882, imposing a ten-year moratorium on the entry of Chinese laborers 
into the United States.100
Conflict between the federal judiciary and Congress over the federal 
courts’ proper jurisdiction over immigration matters dates back to the 
period of the Page Act and the Chinese Exclusion Act.  In 1891, Congress 
passed a law to make agency removal decisions “final” and prevent appeals 
 
 
 93. See infra Part I.D. 
 94. The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress “to establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,” but is otherwise silent on the subject of immigration policy. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8; see also An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 
(1790) (repealed 1795). 
 95. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others:  Legal Claims and Immigration Outside 
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010) (noting that because regulating migration would 
have required the federal government to answer questions about the movement of slaves and 
free blacks, the federal government did little in the area of immigration law until the Civil 
War had settled the slavery question). 
 96. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING:  THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (2006). 
 97. See id. at 19–21.  Prior to 1830, most immigration to the United States came from 
Great Britain and Western Europe. Id. at 19.  In the mid- and late nineteenth century, the 
immigrant population exploded and included immigrants from Ireland, Germany, and Asia. 
Id. at 19–20. 
 98. ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). 
 99. Id. at 25. 
 100. Id. at 25–26. 
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of these decisions to the federal courts.101  Supreme Court decisions of this 
period also reflected non-citizens’ limited ability to challenge immigration 
proceedings in court because of the plenary power doctrine—the Court’s 
strong deference to the power of the Executive and Congress in the 
immigration realm.102  The Court continued to give deference to Congress 
and the Executive under the plenary power doctrine well into the twentieth 
century.103  
Beginning in 1953, the Court began to rule that, notwithstanding the 
plenary power doctrine, non-citizens facing removal are entitled to minimal 
due process even if, as a substantive matter, the Court cannot address 
policies set by Congress and the Executive.104  The Court held that 
immigrants who chose to affiliate themselves with the United States have a 
right to receive basic due process in the procedures that decide whether they 
will be removed or allowed to stay.105 
Two cases—Mathews v. Eldridge106 in 1976 and Landon v. Plasencia107 
in 1982—affirmed that judicial review of administrative procedures is an 
important due process concern and, in doing so, staked out space for 
judicial review as an exception to the plenary power doctrine.108  In 
Mathews, a case concerning Social Security benefits, the Court created a 
three-factor balancing test to determine whether administrative hearings 
meet due process standards:  (1) the individual’s interest in process, (2) the 
government’s interest in fewer procedures, and (3) the costs and benefits of 
mandating additional procedures.109  Although Mathews did not address 
immigration proceedings, it held that any administrative proceeding must 
 
 101. Id. at 32.  At the time, final orders of removal could only be reviewed by the 
Superintendent of Immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury, because the modern Board 
of Immigration Appeals would not be created until 1940. See Regulations Governing 
Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502 (Sept. 4, 1940). 
 102. MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 27. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 731–32 (1893) (holding that immigration proceedings were political decisions not 
subject to due process claims), Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1892) (holding 
that immigrants seeking admission for the first time cannot claim due process protections), 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) 
(upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act’s provision that Chinese laborers who had left the 
United States before the act was passed would not be allowed to reenter if they returned). 
 103. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) 
(rejecting an immigrant’s due process challenge and affirming that the ability to exclude 
noncitizens was a fundamental sovereign act). 
 104. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (establishing a higher standard of 
proof in a removal proceeding); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 603 (1953) 
(holding that an immigrant with ties to the United States was entitled to a hearing); see also 
MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 102.  Neither of these cases actually reached the underlying 
constitutional issue and were decided on the facts of each case. See MOTOMURA, supra note 
96, at 104.  The Court had previously required a constitutional minimum due process in 
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), but “found that the procedures in question were 
sufficient.” Id. at 101–02; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104. 
 105. See MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 102–05. 
 106. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 107. 459 U.S. 21 (1982). 
 108. See MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104–05. 
 109. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104. 
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meet minimum due process standards.110  In Plasencia, the Court held that 
returning lawful immigrants are entitled to procedural due process in 
immigration proceedings, even if they are outside the country when they 
challenge their removal.111  Although the Executive retains power over 
immigrants seeking to enter the country for the first time, those that have 
spent time in the United States are treated differently and executive actions 
toward them must meet minimum due process requirements.112  Taken 
together, the broad affirmation of judicial review in Mathews and the 
specific application of judicial review to immigration removal proceedings 
in Plasencia make clear that the Executive’s immigration-related decisions 
are not categorically excluded from judicial review.113
D.  IIRIRA 
 
One of the central conflicts in the debate over judicial review of 
immigration proceedings is the question of how much discretion should be 
given to the BIA in removal proceedings.  This conflict peaked in 1996 
with the passage of the IIRIRA,114 the statute at issue in Kucana.115
Through IIRIRA, Congress sought to curtail the jurisdiction of federal 
courts to review removal decisions of the BIA.
 
116  Prior to 1996, Congress 
had repeatedly made “empty threats” against the jurisdiction of federal 
courts over controversial issues but had declined to curtail that 
jurisdiction.117  In 1996, however, the passage of both IIRIRA and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996118 (AEDPA) limited 
the ability of federal courts to review various forms of executive action in 
removal proceedings.119  Judicial review of removal orders had arguably 
reduced the speed by which these orders could be carried out, and Congress 
sought to expedite this process by limiting judicial review.120
 
 110. MOTOMURA, supra note 
  For 
96, at 104. 
 111. See Plascencia, 459 U.S. at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 
(1950)). 
 112. See id. at 38–41; MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104–05. 
 113. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text. 
 114. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 756 (characterizing the passage of 
IIRIRA as an “all out war” in the field of immigration law); cf. Louise Weinberg, The Article 
III Box:  The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts,” 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407–09 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court, and not Congress, is 
the primary source of limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts). 
 115. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 831 (2010); see infra Part I.E. 
 116. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 756–57. 
 117. David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty:  Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on 
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2482 (1998). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 
18, 22, 28 and 42 U.S.C.) 
 119. Cole, supra note 117, at 2482–83. 
 120. Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 234 n.6 (1998) [hereinafter Benson, New World] (citing Lenni B. Benson, 
Back to the Future:  Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration 
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1439–43 (1997)) (observing that Congress “apparently 
believed” that removals were being delayed due to the availability of judicial review). 
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“disfavored groups,” such as certain criminals and those lacking medical 
certification, Congress eliminated the express right of judicial review in the 
INA and sought to “insulate” expedited review processes from review.121  
Although the statute intended to increase the speed at which claims were 
processed and to encourage immigrants to follow established procedures, 
IIRIRA’s goals have been criticized as “draconian” and “the culmination of 
over a decade of a progressively and increasingly unkind, ungenerous, and 
corrosive isolationist mentality wholly at odds with the vision of an utopic 
America.”122
IIRIRA’s new provisions eliminated the previous distinction between 
exclusion orders and deportation orders, consolidating these under the 
heading of removal orders.
 
123  An alien can file a petition for review before 
a court of appeals when there is a “final order” in his or her case.124  Within 
thirty days, the alien must file the petition for review in the court of appeals 
that sits in the location where the removal hearing was held.125  When a 
removal order is entered in absentia, the alien must file a motion to reopen 
within 180 days, which is the only relief available to prevent removal.126
IIRIRA also sought to preclude judicial review of discretionary decisions 
made by the BIA and the Attorney General.
 
127  In some areas, such as 
IIRIRA’s provisions for granting waivers, Congress specifically precluded 
all review by federal courts.128  In other areas, such as IIRIRA’s provisions 
for motions to reopen, Congress noted specific instances where federal 
courts do not have jurisdiction to review BIA removal orders.129
Under IIRIRA, service of the petition for review no longer automatically 
stays a removal proceeding, as it had done previously; thus, most petitions 
for review are coupled with a motion for a stay of removal pending 
 
 
 121. Id. at 244, 246. 
 122. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local 
Wrongs, and Legal Fixes:  An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and 
Welfare “Reform,” 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 550 (1998). 
 123. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 235.  Prior to IIRIRA’s passage, the 
government initiated exclusion proceedings to keep an alien from entering the country, and 
deportation proceedings to remove an alien already present in the United States. See 
1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 1.03(2)(b). 
 124. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 236. 
 125. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2006); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 761 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 236–37 (citing 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)). 
 126. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 250. 
 127. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 240–
41.  Grants of asylum were not included in the types of discretionary relief that were no 
longer subject to judicial review. See id. at 240. 
 128. The waiver provision reads in pertinent part:  “No court shall have jurisdiction to 
review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this paragraph.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(12)(A); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 241. 
 129. The motion to reopen provision reads in pertinent part:  “No court shall have 
jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the 
authority for which is specified under this subchapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see also 
Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 241.  From this discrepancy, Professor Benson 
concluded, “[I]f Congress intended to preclude all review, including statutory eligibility, it 
should have just done so with stronger language, as it had in other provisions of the Act.” Id. 
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decision.130  This provision, coupled with BIA reforms enacted by the 
Attorney General in 2002,131 caused a large increase in the number of cases 
decided by the BIA each year.132  The 2002 streamlining procedures 
allowed for one member of the BIA to issue a summary affirmance to 
dispose of a case instead of hearing the case before a panel of BIA 
members.133
With many post-IIRIRA cases involving novel legal issues that are 
inadequately addressed in a short, single-member opinion, the only avenue 
of review was to a federal court.
 
134  This increase in immigration cases 
before the appellate courts has been described as a “surge” that represents a 
“backfir[ing]” of the goals of IIRIRA, since the increase in appeals 
lengthens the time it takes to resolve a case instead of shortening it.135  
Despite the increased number of appeals filed, most immigration cases 
arguably involve a discretionary form of relief for which review was closed 
by IIRIRA.  This spike in BIA decisions, coupled with a large decrease in 
the types of cases that the courts of appeals could actually review, 
represented a notable shift of adjudicatory power from the judiciary to the 
Executive.136
 
 130. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 
  Thus, perhaps the most important consequence of IIRIRA’s 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions was courts’ determinations of what types 
25, at 761.  Professors Legomsky and 
Rodríguez also note that the increase in motions before the courts of appeals poses “difficult 
questions of judicial administration,” because coupling a petition for removal with a motion 
for stay of a removal proceeding, in most cases, increases the number of motions that a court 
must consider. Id. 
 131. See Board of Immigration Appeals:  Procedural Reforms to Improve Case 
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3); Lenni 
B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls:  How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the 
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 37, 44 (2007) (noting that the 2002 reforms were intended to reduce backlog and 
streamline case management procedures at the BIA). 
 132. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 758–59.  In the Ninth Circuit, 896 
immigration cases were filed in 2001 before the BIA reforms were implemented; in 2002 
and 2003, there were 3,578 cases and 4,206 cases, respectively. Id. at 758.  Legomsky and 
Rodríguez also note that the larger volume of BIA dispositions, coupled with the possibility 
for lower quality BIA jurisprudence as a result of this volume, has led to a marked increase 
in the number of petitions for review before the courts of appeals. Id. at 759–60 (citing John 
R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People 
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?  An Empirical 
Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2005)). 
 133. See Benson, supra note 131, at 46. 
 134. Id. at 46–47 (noting that the reforms heightened the complexity of legal issues 
arising in removal proceedings and thus increased the need for review by the courts of 
appeals). 
 135. Id. at 47–48. 
 136. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 240 (“Although no formal statistics are 
available, my own calculations establish that the vast majority of immigration cases involved 
review of a discretionary form of relief.”).  After passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, 
aliens were no longer able to challenge their removals through a habeas petition; petitions for 
review to the courts of appeals became the sole form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see 
also 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 2.04(22)(a). 
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of discretionary decisions could be reviewed by federal courts in the wake 
of IIRIRA.137
E.  Kucana v. Holder 
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder138
1.  Factual Background of Kucana 
 resolved 
the circuit split over whether a regulation promulgated by the Attorney 
General can remove discretionary decisions by the BIA from the review of 
a federal court. 
Agron Kucana came to the United States from Albania in 1995 and 
remained in the country after his business visa expired.139  Kucana 
subsequently applied for asylum and withholding of removal.140  When 
Kucana failed to appear for his removal hearing before an IJ, the judge 
ordered him removed in absentia.141  Kucana filed a motion to reopen, 
which was denied by the IJ and affirmed by the BIA in 2002.142
The BIA denied a second motion to reopen in 2006, and Kucana filed a 
petition for review with the Seventh Circuit.
 
143  The Seventh Circuit panel 
split on whether it could exercise jurisdiction over the petition, with the 
majority holding that it could not.144
 
 137. See Benson, New World, supra note 
  While the majority conceded that the 
discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen was conferred on the BIA 
through a regulation, it noted that this regulation drew its power “from 
provisions in the Act allowing immigration officials to govern their own 
120, at 255–56 (noting that jurisdiction would 
be unclear both due to ambiguity in the statute and the question of whether habeas 
jurisdiction provided a separate avenue for courts to review removal orders regardless of 
Congress’s attempts to strip jurisdiction through IIRIRA).  IIRIRA’s original provisions 
prevented habeas review of removal proceedings, but the Supreme Court held that habeas 
review survived IIRIRA. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297–98 (2001).  After St. Cyr, 
Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, which eliminated habeas review. See generally 8 
GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 104.04.  As a result, habeas review will not be considered 
in this Note.  For an example of a rare case in which habeas review was allowed, see 
Chehazeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 138. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010). 
 139. Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534, 535 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  Kucana claimed that he had missed his hearing because he overslept. See id. 
 142. Id.  At that time, Kucana did not seek judicial review, or leave the United States. See 
id. 
 143. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832–33; see also Kucana, 533 F.3d at 534.  Kucana argued in 
his second motion to reopen that conditions had worsened in Albania since his first hearing 
before the IJ, but the BIA found that conditions in that country had actually improved since 
1997. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832–33.  In a footnote, the Court noted that each alien is 
guaranteed one motion to reopen by statute. See id. at 832 n.5 (citing Dada v. Mukasey, 128 
S. Ct. 2307, 2308 (2008)).  The Court further noted that additional motions are permitted by 
regulation based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal. See id. 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2009)). 
 144. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833; see also Kucana, 533 F.3d at 539.  Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg noted that the split panel below had created a circuit split between the Seventh 
Circuit and all other circuits, which had held that these motions were reviewable under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833. 
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proceedings.”145  Judge Kenneth Ripple concurred and acknowledged that 
the circuit’s precedent in Ali v. Gonzales146 compelled the court’s 
judgment, but believed that the court should reconsider both Ali and 
Kucana en banc to reevaluate whether Congress actually intended to 
deprive the courts of the ability to review motions to reopen.147  Judge 
Richard Cudahy dissented, noting that, without any clear language denying 
judicial review of motions to reopen, the court should follow the “strong 
presumption” in favor of judicial review of administrative proceedings.148  
The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc.149  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 27, 2009.150
2.  The Court’s Statutory Interpretation 
 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that 
the authority to grant or deny a motion to reopen was made discretionary by 
a regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and not 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the 
statute limiting judicial review of “any other decision or action of the 
Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this 
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”151
 
 145. Kucana, 533 F.3d at 536. 
  Justice 
Ginsburg specifically rejected the Seventh Circuit’s argument that the 
regulation “[drew] force” from statute because the regulation was enacted 
 146.  502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 147. See Kucana, 533 F.3d at 539–40 (Ripple, J., concurring). 
 148. See id. at 541 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 
542 (1988)). 
 149. See id. at 541–42 (Ripple, J., dissenting as to denial of rehearing en banc). 
 150. Kucana v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009).  Once certiorari was granted, the 
Department of Justice abandoned the government’s position and declined to argue against 
judicial review of motions to reopen. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. 872, 833 (2010).  The Court 
appointed Amanda C. Leiter, a Professor at Catholic University of America’s Columbus 
School of Law, to argue this side instead. See id. 
 151. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010).  The statute reads in pertinent part: 
No court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is 
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 
1158(a) of this title. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).  The regulation reads in pertinent part: 
The Board [of Immigration Appeals] may at any time reopen or reconsider on its 
own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.  A request to reopen or 
reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, which 
request is made by the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, must be in 
the form of a written motion to the Board.  The decision to grant or deny a motion 
to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the 
restrictions of this section.  The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen 
even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief. 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011).  A separate controversy exists over whether the “post-departure 
bar” preventing appeals after removal is valid, but these cases have questioned 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(d), a separate provision. See, e.g., Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 213 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
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prior to the passage of IIRIRA.152  Counsel for the government argued that 
the jurisdiction-stripping provision refers to “authority . . . specified under 
this subchapter,” and that this provision could be read to say “pursuant to” 
or “subordinate to,” a reading that would include regulations made by the 
Attorney General during the course of carrying out § 1252’s 
requirements.153  The Court rejected this position in favor of the petitioner’s 
view that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review when the statute 
itself explicitly grants discretionary authority to the Attorney General, and 
not when a decision is made discretionary by a regulation alone.154
The Court found the petitioner’s reading of § 1252 persuasive in light of 
the other jurisdictional limitations found in § 1252(a)(2)(A) and (C).
 
155  
Each of these relied solely on its own definitions and not on any external 
regulation.156  Because § 1252(a)(2)(B) was “sandwiched” between these 
two other provisions, the Court read it within that context.157  The Court 
also considered that clause (i) of § 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically enumerated 
five sections of the statute under which no court could review a final 
judgment of the Attorney General—sections 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 
1229c, and 1255.158  Each of these sections addresses a different form of 
discretionary relief from removal.159  The Court reasoned that these specific 
statutory grants of discretion indicate that Congress intended to limit 
judicial review under the immediately following clause (ii)—the question 
before the Court—only in those cases specified in the statute.160  The Court 
rejected a broader reading under which the use of the word “any” expanded 
clause (ii) to exclude review of decisions made discretionary through 
regulation.161
Finally, the Court looked to the nature of the discretion granted in the 
statute and the nature of motions to reopen to aid its interpretation of 
§ 1252.  The government asserted that the discretionary bases for decision 
enumerated in the statute—waivers of inadmissibility based on criminal 
offenses or fraud, cancellation of removal, permission for voluntary 
departure, or adjustment of status—were “substantive decisions . . . made 
by the Executive in the immigration context as a matter of grace, things that 
involve whether aliens can stay in the country or not.”
 
162
 
 152. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 834 & n.9.  Justice Ginsburg noted that 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(a) was published on April 29, 1996, while 8 U.S.C. § 1229 was enacted on 
September 30, 1996. Id. 
  The government 
argued that these decisions, made through the “grace” of the Attorney 
General, are discretionary immigration powers of the kind that are typically 
 153. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 835. 
 154. See id. at 835–36. 
 155. See id. at 836. 
 156. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 836. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. at 836–37. 
 161. See id. at 837 n.14. 
 162. See id. at 837 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Kucana, 130 S. Ct. 827 
(2010) (No. 08-911)). 
2094 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
unreviewable by the courts.163  The Court rejected this position, noting that 
when a court reviews a denial of a motion to reopen, it does not ask the BIA 
and the Attorney General to exercise any “grace,” but instead requires them 
to provide a fair hearing.164  The Court observed that had Congress wished 
to extend the statutory discretion to include regulatory discretion, it “could 
have easily said so.”165
3.  The Court’s Interpretation of IIRIRA’s Legislative History 
 
The Court also considered the legislative history of IIRIRA in holding 
that motions to reopen were not meant to fall outside of judicial review.166  
The Court noted that IIRIRA affected motions to reopen in two separate 
ways:  first, by codifying the requirements for a motion to reopen, and 
second, by barring judicial review of many types of removal decisions.167  
What Congress did not do, the Court held, was codify the regulation 
granting the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen.168  The 
Court in Kucana saw this inaction as Congress’s intent to leave motions to 
reopen in their pre-IIRIRA state—a broad discretion derived from  
regulation, to grant or deny motions to reopen, with such discretion subject 
to judicial review.169  A decision to the contrary would give “the 
Executive . . . a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-
discretion appellate court review.”170  According to the Court, even the 
subsequent amendment to the statute—the REAL ID Act of 2005171—did 
not change the source of authority in discretion over motions to reopen.172
Finally, the Court specifically reserved the question of whether sua 
sponte motions to reopen are governed by this same reasoning.
 
173
 
 163. See id. 
  In doing 
so, the Court noted that the overwhelming pre-Kucana circuit authority 
weighed against allowing judicial review of sua sponte motions to reopen 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 838–39. 
 167. See id. at 838; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(c)(7) (2006) (codifying requirements for a 
motion to reopen); Id. § 1252(a)(2) (limiting judicial review of certain discretionary BIA 
decisions). 
 168. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 838. 
 169. See id. at 838–39 (“It is unsurprising that Congress would leave in place judicial 
oversight of this ‘important [procedural] safeguard’ designed ‘to ensure a proper and lawful 
disposition’ of immigration proceedings, where, as here, the alien’s underlying claim (for 
asylum) would itself be reviewable.” (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–19 
(2008))). 
 170. See id. at 840; see also Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek:  
What Agencies Can (and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1692–
93 (2011) (arguing that when an agency uses regulations to clarify broad statutory language, 
the agency may be attempting to immunize itself from judicial review). 
 171. Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
and 49 U.S.C.). 
 172. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839. 
 173. See id. at 839 n.18. 
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because the decision not to reopen “[was] committed to agency discretion 
by law.”174
4.  The Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review 
of Administrative Decisions 
 
In its final salvo in favor of review of decisions made discretionary by 
regulation, the Court noted the presumption in favor of such review in the 
administrative context.175  When a statute is susceptible to divergent 
readings, the Court favors the interpretation that allows for judicial 
review.176  Because this presumption is “well-settled,” the Court presumed 
that Congress wrote IIRIRA knowing that the Court would allow judicial 
review if the statute was silent or ambiguous in regard to review of 
administrative decisions.177  It takes “clear and convincing evidence” to 
overcome this presumption, which the Court did not find in this case.178  By 
not clearly delegating final authority to the Attorney General, the Court 
instead found that Congress intended for motions to reopen to remain 
subject to judicial review.179
II.  CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS ON SUA SPONTE REVIEW AFTER KUCANA 
 
The Court did not answer the question of whether sua sponte motions to 
reopen were subject to judicial review, under the same reasoning applied in 
Kucana to motions brought by the parties.  Since Kucana, some circuits 
have deferred to pre-Kucana holdings regarding jurisdiction to review sua 
sponte motions, concluding that they lack jurisdiction and noting that 
evaluation of the decision not to reopen sua sponte would be hollow 
without a meaningful standard of review.  Other circuits have noted that, in 
light of Kucana, it may be time to reconsider circuit holdings that denied 
 
 174. Id.  The Court cited Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 2008), as an 
example. See id.  The ambiguity of the phrase “by law” and whether it can include the 
regulation granting sua sponte authority will be discussed in Part II, infra. 
 175. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839 (citing Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 
417, 434 (1995)). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993)). 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 839–40 (“Congress ensured that it, and only it, would limit the federal 
courts’ jurisdiction . . . .  While Congress pared back judicial review in IIRIRA, it did not 
delegate to the Executive authority to do so.”).  Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion 
concurring in the result but noting that the case could have been decided on narrower 
statutory interpretation grounds. See id. at 840–41 (Alito, J., concurring).  Justice Alito 
argued that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—which refers to authority “under 
this subchapter”—refers to subchapter II of Title 8, chapter 12, which consists of §§ 1151–
1381. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 840.  Subchapter II does not grant the Attorney General the 
authority to make decisions discretionary through regulation. Id.  Instead, as Justice Alito 
noted, subchapter I grants this authority. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107.  Because 
the authority to make motions to reopen discretionary through statute stems from subchapter 
I, Justice Alito argued that subchapter II’s limiting provisions cannot be said to circumvent 
judicial review of motions to reopen. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 841. 
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jurisdiction over sua sponte motions, and to exercise jurisdiction over these 
discretionary decisions.180
A.  Circuits Denying Jurisdiction After Kucana 
 
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have rejected jurisdiction over sua sponte motions to reopen, even after 
Kucana.  These circuits have relied on pre-Kucana case law to hold that the 
decision to reopen sua sponte is purely discretionary and thus unreviewable 
for two principal reasons:  (1) Kucana did not overrule previous circuit 
decisions on the issue of sua sponte reviewability, and (2) no meaningful 
standard of review exists by which courts can review the decision not to 
reopen sua sponte. 181
1.  Circuits Using Kucana’s Bracketing of Sua Sponte Motions 
to Deny Jurisdiction 
 
In Neves v. Holder,182 the First Circuit affirmed that pre-Kucana 
precedent on sua sponte motions was still good law after the Kucana Court 
declined to rule on the sua sponte issue, and thus the panel held that it did 
not have jurisdiction.183  The First Circuit had already ruled on Neves’s 
case in 2009, but the Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit’s original 
decision and remanded in the wake of Kucana.184  Neves, a Brazilian 
citizen, had been found ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal in 
2000.185  Represented by a new attorney, Neves filed his first unsuccessful 
motion to reopen in 2003, arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel had 
led to his first unfavorable judgment.186  The BIA denied this motion.187  In 
2006, Neves filed a second motion to reopen based on another ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.188  Finding that Neves had not shown diligence 
in pursuing his claim, the BIA denied the motion and declined to reopen sua 
sponte.189
The First Circuit held that its first opinion in Neves’s case, where the 
court found no jurisdiction over motions to reopen when brought by the 
parties, was clearly erroneous after Kucana, because the Supreme Court’s 
 
 
 180. The Fourth Circuit has not addressed reviewability of the BIA’s decision not to 
reopen sua sponte since the Kucana decision.  For the pre-Kucana rule on review of the 
decision not to reopen sua sponte, see Doh v. Gonzales, 193 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir. 
2006). 
 181. See, e.g., Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 3025 (2011); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 182. 613 F.3d 30. 
 183.  See id. at 34–35. 
 184. See Neves v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3273, 3273 (2010); see also Neves v. Holder, 568 
F.3d 41, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2009), vacated by Neves, 130 S. Ct. 3273.  In that case, the First 
Circuit had held that it lacked jurisdiction over a sua sponte motion to reopen. See id. 
 185. Neves, 613 F.3d at 33. 
 186. Id. at 33–34. 
 187. Id. at 34. 
 188. Id.; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 189. Neves, 613 F.3d at 34. 
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holding was directly contrary to the First Circuit’s earlier ruling.190  The 
First Circuit observed, however, that the Kucana decision did not upset 
circuit precedent on whether sua sponte motions to reopen were subject to 
this same line of reasoning.191  The court noted that sua sponte decisions 
were made discretionary through regulation, but cited to its earlier holding 
in Luis v. INS192 in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction.193  In Luis, the 
court had held that because motions to reopen were “committed to [the] 
unfettered discretion” of the BIA through regulation, it could not exercise 
jurisdiction.194  Luis relied on Heckler v. Chaney,195 a case where the 
Supreme Court held that section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act196 (APA) places an agency decision beyond judicial review when 
Congress grants the agency discretionary power and prescribes no 
“meaningful manageable standards” for the authority.197
In Gashi v. Holder,
 
198 the Second Circuit held that its pre-Kucana case 
law on review of sua sponte motions to reopen was still binding 
precedent.199  Mustafe Gashi, a citizen of Yugoslavia, appealed the BIA’s 
denial of his motion to reopen to the Second Circuit in 2009.200  In a brief 
summary order, the court held that its previous rule in Ali v. Gonzales201 
still governed sua sponte motions to reopen, and thus the court could not 
review Gashi’s case.202
In Ali, a citizen of Bangladesh petitioned the Second Circuit to review the 
BIA’s decision denying his untimely motion to reopen—filed eleven years 
after the BIA originally dismissed his case—and the decision to decline to 
reopen sua sponte.
   
203
 
 190. See id. at 35. 
  Ali argued that, although his motion was untimely, 
his case presented “compelling and exceptional circumstances” that 
 191. See id. 
 192. 196 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 193. See Neves, 613 F.3d at 35 (citing Luis, 196 F.3d at 40). 
 194. Luis, 196 F.3d at 40. 
 195. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 196. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006). 
 197. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830; see also Luis, 196 F.3d at 40–41.  Section 701(a)(2) of 
the APA reads in pertinent part:  “This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, 
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2006).  Luis applied 
Heckler’s analysis to an agency inaction—the decision not to reopen sua sponte. See Luis, 
196 F.3d at 40–41.  For an argument that Heckler’s analysis should not apply to agency 
inaction and that agency inaction should not be exempted from judicial review, see Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667–69 (2004). 
 198. 382 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 199. See id. at 22–23. 
 200. Id. at 22. 
 201. 448 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 202. Gashi, 382 F. App’x at 23; see also Ali, 448 F.3d at 517.  In Ali, the Second Circuit 
noted that because sua sponte motions to reopen were committed to the BIA’s discretion by 
regulation, these motions could not be reviewed by the court of appeals. See id. at 517–18.  
This view was also expressed in Tavarez v. Holder, 422 F. App’x 19, 20–21 (2d Cir. 2011); 
Hodzic v. Holder, 373 F. App’x 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2010); and Ruiz v. Holder, 374 F. App’x 
170, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 203. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 516. 
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required the BIA to exercise its sua sponte authority.204  The Second 
Circuit, noting that this was a matter of first impression, looked to the First, 
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which had 
determined that they lacked jurisdiction in such cases.205  Among other 
cases, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,206 which held that the decision not to 
reopen sua sponte was outside of the authority of courts to review, 
regardless of whether discretion came from regulation or statute, because no 
meaningful standard existed for courts to conduct a review of sua sponte 
decisions.207
In Ozeiry v. Attorney General,
 
208 the Third Circuit also applied pre-
Kucana precedent to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction over sua sponte 
motions to reopen.209  Hatem El Ozeiry, a citizen of Egypt, filed a motion 
to reopen after an IJ found him removable.210  The BIA denied this motion 
in 2008, as well as a second motion to reopen that Ozeiry filed in 2009.211  
In refusing jurisdiction over Ozeiry’s claim, the Third Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court in Kucana declined to rule on the sua sponte issue, and thus 
did not affect the controlling pre-Kucana precedent holding that such 
decisions were not reviewable.212
The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Chehazeh v. Attorney General
 
213 
concerned an unusual situation in which a district court, and not a circuit, 
reviewed the BIA’s decision to reopen sua sponte.214  Daoud Chehazeh 
appealed the BIA’s decision to reopen sua sponte and reverse a 2001 
decision to grant him asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158.215  He initially 
appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to review 
under habeas jurisdiction, and this application was denied.216  On appeal, 
the Third Circuit held that, under the particular facts of Chehazeh’s case, 
the district court was entitled to review the decision to reopen sua sponte 
under its habeas jurisdiction.217
 
 204. See id. at 517. 
  Since no removal order had been entered in 
 205. See id. at 518. 
 206. 371 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 207. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 518; Enriquez-Alvarado, 371 F.3d at 249–50. 
 208. 400 F. App’x 647 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 209. See id. at 649–50. 
 210. Id. at 648.  The motion to reopen was based on Ozeiry’s new marriage to a U.S. 
citizen. See id.  The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have determined that they lack such jurisdiction 
using similar reasoning. See Bustillo-Martinez v. Holder, 431 F. App’x 265, 266–67 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that the decision not to reopen sua sponte is unreviewable because it 
lacks a corresponding standard of review); Bakanovas v. Holder, 438 F. App’x 717, 722 
(10th Cir. 2011) (citing Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004)) 
(refusing to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte). 
 211. Ozeiry, 400 F. App’x at 648–49. 
 212. See id. at 649–50 (citing Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006)); see 
also Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  This view was affirmed in 
Jia Ying Lin v. Att’y Gen., 421 F. App’x 241, 242 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 213. 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 214. Id. at 125. 
 215. Id. at 122. 
 216. Id. at 124. 
 217. Id. at 125. 
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the case, IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply, and thus 
habeas jurisdiction remained intact.218  Four factors informed the court’s 
decision:  the BIA’s decision was not committed to agency discretion by 
law, no statute precluded review, the action was a final agency action, and 
no “special statutory review” provision required that it be brought in 
another forum.219
The Third Circuit noted that review of a decision not to reopen would be 
precluded under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Heckler v. Chaney,  since 
the decision not to reopen sua sponte was committed to agency discretion 
by law and the BIA exercised no coercive power by deciding not to act.
   
220  
Taking action to open a case sua sponte, however, was not subject to this 
same analysis, and thus could be reviewed by the circuit court.221
2.  Circuits Finding No Meaningful Standard by Which 
to Review the BIA’s Decision Not to Reopen Sua Sponte 
 
In Ochoa v. Holder,222 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its sua sponte 
precedent in light of Kucana and denied jurisdiction over a BIA decision 
not to reopen sua sponte.223  In 2006, an IJ denied Ana Rosa Ochoa, a 
Mexican citizen, her application for cancellation of removal.224  In 2007, 
Ochoa appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and asked 
the BIA to reopen the case through its sua sponte authority.225  On appeal, 
the Eighth Circuit refused jurisdiction, noting that its decision in Tamenut v. 
Mukasey226 remained good law following Kucana and thus precluded 
review.227  In Tamenut, the Eighth Circuit panel had considered the lack of 
a standard by which to review the sua sponte motion as evidence that this 
decision was under the “unfettered authority” of the BIA and not subject to 
judicial review.228  Without a clear standard from Congress, the Eighth 
Circuit had noted that any standard of review would have to be created by 
the court without the guidance of the legislature.229
 
 218. Id. at 133. 
  Thus, the decision to 
 219. Id. at 127. 
 220. Id. at 129 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832; Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 
473–75 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 221. Id. at 129. 
 222. 604 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 223. See id. at 550. 
 224. Id. at 546–47. 
 225. Id. at 547–48.  When Ochoa petitioned the Eighth Circuit, her petition did not clearly 
specify whether it was a party’s motion to reopen or whether it was a request for the BIA to 
exercise its sua sponte authority.  Because Ochoa petitioned the BIA “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(a)” to reopen “on their own [sic] motion,” the Eighth Circuit found that Ochoa had 
petitioned the BIA to use its sua sponte authority. See id. at 549. 
 226. 521 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 227. See Ochoa, 604 F.3d at 549.  Judge Clarence Arlen Beam, author of the dissent in 
Tamenut, wrote for the majority in Ochoa. See id. at 546. 
 228. See Tamenut, 521 F.3d at 1004. 
 229. See id. (“The regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides no guidance as to the 
BIA’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors for the BIA to consider in deciding 
whether to reopen sua sponte, places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and specifies no 
standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion.”). 
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reopen sua sponte was committed to the agency “by law” and was out of the 
reach of judicial review.230  Relying on this argument, the Ochoa court also 
noted that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler v. Chaney and the 
APA, a court could not review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua 
sponte authority because there was no law to apply.231
In Jaimes-Aguirre v. U.S. Attorney General,
  
232 the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed Lenis v. U.S. Attorney General,233 its pre-Kucana precedent on sua 
sponte motions to reopen.234  The opinion in Jaimes-Aguirre did not 
analyze the jurisdictional question at length, deferring instead to Lenis.235  
Lenis had relied on the APA, which prevents judicial review when a 
decision is committed to agency discretion by law.236  The court in Lenis 
relied on Heckler to hold that without a meaningful statutory standard by 
which to review sua sponte motions to reopen, a court could not consider 
whether the BIA had properly applied its discretion.237  The permissive 
language of 5 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which grants the BIA the choice to 
exercise sua sponte authority, also hindered the finding of a standard for 
courts to use when reviewing.238
B.  Circuits Amenable to Reviewing Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen 
 
Following Kucana, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
have also denied jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua 
sponte, but have noted their willingness to find jurisdiction over these 
decisions in various ways.  These circuits have urged rehearing cases en 
banc or exercised review over the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte 
when the BIA’s decision is based on a clearly erroneous interpretation of 
the law. 
1.  Jurisdiction Based on Separation of Powers and Kucana’s Reasoning 
Some circuit panels have used Kucana’s reasoning and separation of 
powers arguments to urge circuits to adopt jurisdiction over the decision not 
to reopen sua sponte.  For example, in Gor v. Holder,239
 
 230. See id. at 1005.  The court in Tamenut also addressed a due process claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment (which it found within its power to do), but found that Tamenut had 
not brought a colorable claim. See id. 
 a Sixth Circuit 
panel urged the circuit to reconsider its pre-Kucana precedent precluding 
 231. See Ochoa, 604 F.3d at 549–50. 
 232. 369 F. App’x 101 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 233. 525 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 234. See Jaimes-Aguirre, 369 F. App’x at 103.  The Eleventh Circuit also followed this 
view in Qing Yun Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 429 F. App’x 889, 891–92 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 235. See Jaimes-Aguirre, 369 F. App’x at 103. 
 236. See Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1293 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006)). 
 237. See id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)); see also Tamenut v. 
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 238. See Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1293–94. 
 239. 607 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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review of sua sponte motions to reopen.240  Tushar Gor, a citizen of India, 
was convicted of child abandonment under Ohio state law and was 
scheduled for removal.241  Gor filed an untimely petition for review and 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit when the BIA declined to reopen his case 
under its sua sponte authority.242  Although the panel cited Kucana in 
rejecting the government’s contention that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 could place 
review of Gor’s motion to reopen outside of the purview of an Article III 
court, it concluded that the circuit’s precedent still placed sua sponte 
decisions not to reopen outside of its review.243
The panel believed that the circuit’s pre-Kucana decisions should be 
revisited.
 
244  The Sixth Circuit stated that Heckler should not be construed 
to hold that an agency can strip an Article III court of jurisdiction through 
regulation, as the government had argued.245  Kucana had “soundly 
rejected” that line of reasoning,246 and affirmed Heckler so far as it held 
that curtailment of judicial review of agency decisions must emanate from 
Congress, and not the agency itself.247  The Sixth Circuit also noted that 
another line of reasoning drawn from Heckler’s holding—that without a 
meaningful standard of review for the decision set by Congress, there can 
be no judicial review—would mean that no agency decision could be 
reviewable.248  This would directly contradict Kucana’s holding.249
The majority concluded by noting that Gor’s case provided a perfect 
example of why discretionary BIA decisions should be reviewable and, 
more generally, why all agency decisions should be reviewable.
 
250  In Gor’s 
original hearing, the IJ failed to provide him with a “list of free legal 
service-providers” which, the Sixth Circuit noted, might have led to a 
different outcome in his case.251
 
 240. See id. at 182 (“[We] must conclude that we have no jurisdiction to review the denial 
of the motion to reopen sua sponte, although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Kucana . . . casts considerable doubt on our circuit precedent that dictates that 
result . . . .  [We] urge the en banc court to reexamine the validity of our prior cases in this 
area.”).  In the Sixth Circuit, a panel decision remains controlling authority unless it is 
overturned en banc or a Supreme Court decision renders it invalid. See Rutherford v. 
Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
  The court also noted that the BIA 
misunderstood the law regarding removals for those convicted of child 
 241. Gor, 607 F.3d at 181. 
 242. Id. at 182.  Gor argued in his petition to the Sixth Circuit that his actions amounted 
to “non-support” instead of child abandonment, but failed to raise this and other claims 
during the original appeal to the BIA. See id. 
 243. See id. at 186–87. 
 244. See id. at 187–88 (citing Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 245. See id. at 188–89. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 189. 
 248. See id. at 189–90; Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that 
discretionary decisions were unreviewable where Congress had created no meaningful 
standard by which the court could review the decision). 
 249. Gor, 607 F.3d at 190. 
 250. See id. at 193. 
 251. See id. at 191. 
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abuse or neglect crimes when it reviewed Gor’s claim.252  According to the 
Sixth Circuit panel, a lack of review of these discretionary decisions would 
allow erroneous legal conclusions of the BIA to stand without any oversight 
by the judiciary.253
In Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder,
   
254 the Ninth Circuit also grudgingly 
affirmed its pre-Kucana precedent of Ekimian v. INS,255 and determined 
that it lacked jurisdiction over a denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte.256  
Bernardino Eduardo Mejia-Hernandez, a citizen of Guatemala, applied for 
asylum in 1993 but was ordered deported in absentia.257  Mejia-Hernandez 
and his wife had employed Bryan Ramos, who falsely represented himself 
as an attorney, for seven years.258  Once Mejia-Hernandez and his wife 
discovered that Ramos was not an attorney, they retained new counsel and 
Mejia-Hernandez filed a motion to reopen in 2005.259  The IJ reopened sua 
sponte and granted relief under section 203(c) of the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act260 (NACARA).  The BIA 
overturned the IJ’s decision to review sua sponte, and Mejia appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.261
Although bound by precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel noted that “[t]he 
overall thrust of Kucana suggests that sua sponte reopening should be 
subject to review” and noted that if the question were one of first 
impression, the court might be open to finding jurisdiction over the 
question.
 
262  Under Ekimian, sua sponte decisions were not reviewable 
because they lacked any clear standard by which to review them—meaning 
that they had been committed to agency discretion by law.263  The panel 
noted that this was at odds with Kucana’s reasoning; where the Ekimian 
court was searching for an affirmative standard by which to review sua 
sponte authority, the Kucana Court sought clear statutory language that 
placed motions to reopen outside of judicial review.264
 
 252. See id. at 192–93. 
  However, without 
 253. See id. at 193. 
 254. 633 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 255. 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 256. Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 823–24. 
 257. Id. at 820–21. 
 258. Id. at 821. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  NACARA allows for special dispensation of removal claims for aliens seeking 
asylum from civil wars and political events in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the 
former Soviet Republics. See Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 624. 
 261. Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 822.  The Ninth Circuit considered whether it had 
jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision to overturn the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen in light 
of Kucana and prior circuit precedent. See id. at 823. 
 262. Id. (“There is a longstanding tradition of judicial review of reopenings in 
immigration cases; there is no statute suggesting review is not available; there is a 
presumption favoring review; and there is a separation-of-powers concern against giving the 
Executive authority to withhold cases from judicial review.”). 
 263. Id; see also Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 264. See Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 823. 
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any changes in the law since Ekimian, the Mejia-Hernandez court ruled that 
it could not review the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte.265
Other Ninth Circuit decisions lend support to the call to reconsider 
Ekimian’s holding.  In ANA International, Inc. v. Way,
 
266 the court held that 
analysis of judicial review through the APA is inapplicable where IIRIRA’s 
more specific provisions govern.267  The court also noted that only in “rare 
instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case 
there is no law to apply” would analysis through the APA be necessary.268  
The Ninth Circuit also noted in Spencer Enterprises v. United States269 that 
analysis under the APA can be avoided when agency practice and 
regulations create a standard for reviewing an agency’s decisions for which 
Congress has not provided a meaningful standard of review through 
statute.270
2.  Jurisdiction Because a Standard Exists by Which 
to Review the Decision Not to Reopen 
 
Some circuits have found jurisdiction where the BIA’s decision not to 
reopen sua sponte is based on a misinterpretation of law.  In Mahmood v. 
Holder,271 the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision not to review 
sua sponte and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings due to 
the BIA’s misinterpretation of the relevant law.272  Tahir Mohammad 
Mahmood, a citizen of Pakistan, moved to reopen his removal proceedings 
based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen.273  The BIA denied his motion, and 
declined to reopen under its sua sponte authority.274  The Second Circuit 
held that while Ali’s precedent prevented the court from reviewing the 
decision not to reopen sua sponte, sua sponte decisions were reviewable 
where the BIA relied on a misinterpretation of the relevant law in making 
its decision.275  The Second Circuit noted that, on remand, the BIA would 
still be free to ignore the Second Circuit’s urging to reopen sua sponte, and 
that such a decision would then be unreviewable.276
In Pllumi v. Attorney General,
 
277
 
 265. See id. at 823–24. 
 the Third Circuit likewise held that 
where the BIA’s decision not to grant a sua sponte motion to reopen was 
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of law, the court of appeals had 
 266. 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 267. Id. at 890. 
 268. Id. at 890–91 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
 269. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 270. Id. at 691. 
 271. 570 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 272. See id. at 471. 
 273. Id. at 467. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See id. at 469.  The BIA had incorrectly interpreted whether the filing of a motion to 
reopen automatically tolled the period for voluntary departure, in part because the Supreme 
Court had not yet decided Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008). See Mahmood, 570 
F.3d at 469–71. 
 276. See id. at 471. 
 277. 642 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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the authority to review the BIA’s decision.278  An IJ had denied Tonin 
Pllumi, a citizen of Albania, withholding of removal in 2002.279  The BIA 
upheld the ruling in 2007, and declined to grant Pllumi’s motion to reopen 
or exercise its own sua sponte authority in 2009.280  Pllumi claimed that he 
would be subject to persecution if returned to Albania because of his 
religious and political beliefs.281  His motion to reopen also cited the 
inability of the Albanian healthcare system to treat injuries that he sustained 
in a hit-and-run accident.282
The Pllumi court noted that the sua sponte authority, made discretionary 
by regulation, lies solely with the BIA and is usually unreviewable.
 
283  In 
this case, however, the Third Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s rule in 
Mahmood:  when the BIA has declined to exercise sua sponte authority 
based on a misunderstanding of the law, the court of appeals has the 
authority to review the decision and remand back to the BIA, which would 
still possess discretion over whether to exercise its sua sponte authority.284  
The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s order and remanded Pllumi’s case, 
holding that the BIA had mistakenly believed that the quality of healthcare 
in Albania was not “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).285
Prior to Kucana, one circuit judge had also proposed review based on 
“exceptional circumstances.”  In response to the argument that the lack of a 
standard precluded review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte, Judge 
Clarence Arlen Beam, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Tamenut, argued that administrative law recognizing sua sponte review in 
“exceptional circumstances” and case law explaining when “exceptional 
circumstances” occur could provide a meaningful standard of review for 
courts to utilize.
 
286  Judge Beam conceded that this deferential standard 
might lead federal courts to affirm the BIA in most cases, but noted that 
“[t]he critical factor . . . is that review is proper.”287
III.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUA SPONTE MOTIONS TO REOPEN 
THROUGH KUCANA’S REASONING 
 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Kucana specifically reserved the issue 
of whether the decision not to reopen sua sponte was subject to judicial 
 
 278. See id. at 159–60. 
 279. Id. at 157. 
 280. Id. at 157–58. 
 281. Id. at 157. 
 282. Id. at 158. 
 283. See id. at 159–60 (citing Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474–75 (3d Cir. 
2003)). 
 284. See id.; see also Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 285. See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 163.  Had this been “other serious harm,” there would have 
been grounds for relief from his removal, making Pllumi’s inability to seek treatment for his 
injuries if removed a factor worthy of consideration by the BIA. Id. 
 286. See Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 2008) (Beam, J., 
dissenting). 
 287. Id. at 1006–07. 
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review.288
Part III.A argues that courts should review the BIA’s decision not to 
reopen sua sponte, both because this power is granted to the BIA through 
regulation and because the courts can apply a meaningful standard of 
review to these cases.  Part III.B argues that judicial review of the decision 
not to reopen sua sponte is in line with the Court’s historical move toward 
greater review of executive immigration decisions within the plenary power 
doctrine. 
  The circuit courts have subsequently shown division on this 
issue, with some circuits holding fast to pre-Kucana case law, while others 
call for these cases to be revisited in light of Kucana.  This Note argues that 
Kucana’s analysis should allow for judicial review of the BIA’s decision 
not to reopen sua sponte. 
A.  Review of Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen Follows 
from Kucana’s Reasoning 
Because the BIA’s sua sponte power is derived from regulation,289
1.  Sua Sponte Power Should Be Subject to Review by the Courts 
 it 
should be subject to the same review as party motions to reopen.  Circuit 
courts should use the BIA’s own “exceptional circumstances” standard to 
review the decision not to review sua sponte in order to ensure fair hearings 
for aliens before the BIA. 
In Kucana, the Supreme Court held that when a decision of the Attorney 
General (or the BIA) is made discretionary by statute, courts may not 
review that decision.290  Sua sponte authority is not granted by statute, but 
by the same regulation at issue in Kucana.291
The authority to reopen, whether on motion by the parties or sua sponte 
power, is an important discretionary power used to ensure a fair proceeding.  
Unlike most substantive immigration powers, which are reserved for 
Congress and the Executive under the plenary power doctrine, sua sponte 
motions to reopen represent a power exercised as part of the due process 
required during an immigration proceeding.
  Without explicit statutory 
language granting the power to reopen sua sponte, the decision not to 
reopen should not evade Kucana’s reasoning:  a power made discretionary 
by regulation alone cannot be removed from review of the courts. 
292
 
 288. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 n.18 (2010); see also supra Part I.E. 
  In this sense, the decision 
not to reopen sua sponte is the same as the decision not to reopen on a 
motion brought by a party in the case.  As a result, under Kucana’s 
reasoning, both should be reviewable.  When new facts or evidence become 
available, and the strict ninety-day window imposed by IIRIRA for filing a 
motion to reopen has passed, asking the BIA to exercise its sua sponte 
power fills the same role as a motion to reopen during the ninety-day 
 289. See supra note 63–64 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 291. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011)). 
 292. See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text. 
2106 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
window:  to correct the record and evaluate the original decision in the light 
of this new evidence.293
The distinction between agency action and inaction should not preclude 
review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte.  When the BIA decides not 
to reopen sua sponte, its decision still has major consequences for an alien 
seeking to remain in this country, and is an exercise of “coercive power” in 
the sense that the Heckler Court held would merit judicial review.
 
294  The 
Court in Kucana made no distinction between agency action and inaction, 
considering the decision not to grant Kucana’s motion to reopen as an 
example of agency action.295
Review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte is also in line with the 
Court’s interpretation of congressional intent in IIRIRA.  The Court found 
that Congress codified the requirements of the motion to reopen, but did not 
codify the Attorney General’s power to grant or deny these motions.
  Thus, even if the decision not to reopen sua 
sponte is deemed agency inaction, this status alone should not preclude 
review under Kucana’s reasoning. 
296  
The Court found that IIRIRA’s silence on motions to reopen, in the midst of 
specific carve-outs and limits on judicial review, meant that Congress did 
not intend to exclude motions to reopen from judicial review.297  Similarly, 
Congress could have chosen to codify the Attorney General’s discretion 
over sua sponte motions to reopen or specifically shield these decisions 
from judicial review.298  Such language in the statute would have shown 
Congress’s clear intent to place the decision not to reopen sua sponte 
outside of the purview of the courts.  Congress’s silence should not be 
construed to allow the Executive Branch the power to declare itself beyond 
judicial oversight.299  Doing so would equate congressional silence with the 
delegation to the Executive of the authority to alter the jurisdiction of the 
federal judiciary.300
The Kucana Court’s final argument in favor of judicial review, the broad 
presumption in favor of review of administrative decisions, should also 
apply to sua sponte motions to reopen.  The Court’s well-settled policy of 
favoring judicial review where a jurisdiction-stripping provision is 
ambiguous puts Congress on notice that its silence will be construed, 
wherever possible, as allowing for judicial review of an agency decision.
  In the face of Congress’s silence, sua sponte motions 
should also be subject to judicial review. 
301  
In Kucana, the Court construed Congress’s silence in IIRIRA to find 
judicial review of these decisions proper.302
 
 293. See supra notes 
  A similar analysis of 
58–66 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. See generally Bressman, supra note 197. 
 295. See Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010). 
 296. Id. at 838; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 837–38 . 
 298. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 169–69 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Clark & Leiter, supra note 170, at 1698–1704 (discussing nondelegation and 
judicial review of agency discretion). 
 301. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. 
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Congress’s silence on sua sponte motions to reopen also invites the 
presumption that judicial review of these decisions should be allowed.  This 
distinction should apply regardless of whether a court is reviewing an 
exercise of discretion or the decision not to exercise that discretion.303
2.  Courts Can Find a Meaningful Standard by which to Review Sua Sponte 
Decisions 
  The 
important distinction is whether discretion has been granted through statute 
or regulation, not whether the court is reviewing an action or lack of action. 
While the question of whether the decision to reopen sua sponte is made 
discretionary by statute or by regulation may appear to be a simple one, the 
question of whether a meaningful standard of review exists by which to 
evaluate this decision is more complex.  Some circuit courts denying 
review—the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits—have relied on both the APA 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney to find that the 
BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte is “committed to agency discretion 
by law” because Congress has supplied no meaningful standard by which to 
review these decisions, making any review of the decision not to reopen sua 
sponte meaningless.304  In Tamenut, for example, the Eighth Circuit held 
that, under Heckler, any standard of review would be meaningless because 
courts would create it without guidance from Congress.305
The Heckler-APA line of reasoning should not apply for two reasons.  
First, the APA’s general provisions precluding judicial review are 
superseded by IIRIRA’s specific provisions that either strip judicial review 
or leave it intact.
 
306  The Ninth Circuit in ANA International, in finding the 
APA inapplicable where more specific IIRIRA provisions governed, noted 
that the APA only applied in “rare instances where statutes are drawn in 
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.”307  Motions 
to reopen are not drawn so broadly as to have no law to apply, because case 
law created by the BIA and statutory provisions for motions to reopen 
brought by the parties can provide standards by which to review the 
decision not to reopen sua sponte.308  The Ninth Circuit also noted in 
Spencer Enterprises that agency practice and regulations can inform 
judicial review of an agency decision where Congress has not provided a 
meaningful standard of review through statute.309
 
 303. See Bressman, supra note 
  Because IIRIRA’s 
guidelines provide the analysis for motions to reopen, the APA should be 
inapplicable.  Even if 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(a), the regulation granting sua 
sponte authority, were so broad as to make review less meaningful, BIA 
197, at 1697 (arguing that a decision by an agency not to 
act should be reviewable unless there is clear statutory language to the contrary). 
 304. See Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2010); James-Aguirre v. Att’y 
Gen., 369 F. App’x 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 305. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 307. ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2004) 
 308. See supra notes 270, 282–87 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
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practices could inform the standards that courts use to review these 
decisions.310
Second, the Court in Kucana squarely rejected the inference from 
Heckler that agencies could place themselves outside the purview of the 
courts through regulation where Congress had not acted.
 
311  In Gor, the 
Sixth Circuit noted that its precedential case on sua sponte motions to 
reopen—Harchenko—relied on Heckler, the APA, and the now flawed 
premise that an agency could use Heckler to justify removing itself from the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts without an act of Congress.312  Chief Judge 
Alice Batchelder, in her concurring opinion in Gor, justified continued 
adherence to that premise on the basis that sua sponte authority was created 
by regulation alone and not codified in statute; thus, she argued that an alien 
had no right to a sua sponte reopening and no right to have this decision 
reviewed by a court.313  This argument fails because motions to reopen by 
the parties were not created by regulation either.  IIRIRA merely codified a 
pre-existing procedural remedy.314
Although courts sympathetic to Heckler’s analysis point to the lack of a 
meaningful standard, a few potential standards can be gleaned from relevant 
case law.  One standard that courts could apply is to review sua sponte 
denials when the BIA misinterprets the relevant law.
  Creation by regulation alone does not 
distinguish the power to reopen upon a party’s motion from the power to do 
so sua sponte.  Therefore, Kucana and its reasoning should be the 
applicable standard for determining jurisdiction to review sua sponte 
motions to reopen, not Heckler and the APA. 
315  In Mahmood, the 
Second Circuit noted that the BIA’s decision would be reviewable when it 
was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law, regardless of circuit 
precedent prohibiting review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte.316  In 
Pllumi, the Third Circuit adopted the Mahmood standard and vacated the 
BIA’s order declining to review sua sponte based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the law.317
Therefore, the strongest standard would be one that reviews sua sponte 
motions to reopen for the existence of “exceptional circumstances” under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  The BIA uses “exceptional circumstances” as 
its own test for when to exercise its sua sponte power, and the body of law 
  This standard focuses on the issue of whether 
the BIA has correctly interpreted the law that it is charged with applying, an 
issue that is tangentially related to the exercise of sua sponte power itself.  
A mistake of law standard, however, would still not allow for review of a 
decision not to reopen sua sponte where the BIA had applied the correct 
interpretation of law in a manner that led to an unjust outcome. 
 
 310. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 312. See id. 
 313. Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 194–95 (6th Cir. 2010) (Batchelder, C.J., concurring). 
 314. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 271–85 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 277–82 and accompanying text. 
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created by the BIA can inform courts as to its meaning.318  In fact, 
Congress has defined “exceptional circumstances” for removal proceedings 
in IIRIRA at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, although not specifically in the section 
governing motions to reopen.319  Although an exceptional circumstances 
test applied through an abuse of discretion standard might lead to 
affirmation of the BIA’s decision not to reopen in most cases, judicial 
review of this decision still provides an important procedural safeguard that 
ensures a fair proceeding before the BIA.320
Some may argue that reviewing the decision not to reopen sua sponte 
under such lenient standards requires precious judicial resources that are 
better spent elsewhere.  Yet in their study of the large increase in petitions 
for review to the courts of appeals in the early 2000s, John Palmer, Stephen 
Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin noted that denial of a motion to reopen or 
reconsider was “likely to be appealed at a much lower rate than decisions in 
appeals directly from IJs.”
 
321  Reviews of decisions not to reopen sua 
sponte most likely represent a small subset of the petitions for review filed 
each year, in part because the courts of appeals would apply an “abuse of 
discretion” standard that makes review of the decision not to reopen 
potentially less fruitful than a petition for review of the underlying BIA 
decision itself.322
B.  Review of Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen as Part of the Court’s Move 
Toward Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings 
  Adding a relatively small proportion of all removal cases 
to the federal docket will not create a drag on the efficiency of the judicial 
system, and review in these cases ensures a fair proceeding for all aliens 
facing removal. 
Until the 1950s, the plenary power doctrine and its demand of deference 
to the Executive in immigration matters limited the Supreme Court’s reach 
into immigration policy.323  Since then, the Supreme Court has moved 
toward finding room within the plenary powers doctrine for due process and 
fair hearings in immigration proceedings.324  In Mathews, the case that 
created the due process standard for administrative proceedings, one of the 
factors put forward by the Court was the risk of mistake due to inadequate 
procedures.325
 
 318. See supra note 
  The Mathews Court was concerned that an overemphasis on 
speed and efficiency was leading to unjust decisions in administrative 
64 and accompanying text. 
 319. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e) (2006). 
 320. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr, & Cronin, supra note 132, at 38 n.202 (citing Oh v. 
Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611, 612 (9th Cir. 2005); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2004)) (noting that circuits may use an “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing 
the decision to reopen, but will utilize a higher standard when reviewing the decision on the 
merits). 
 321. Palmer et al., supra note 132, at 38–39. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 104–12 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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hearings.326  With increased judicial criticism of the BIA and a swell of 
appeals to the circuit courts,327
In Plasencia, the Court required procedural due process in proceedings 
for returning immigrants, and opened the door for review of immigration 
proceedings that did not meet this due process standard.
 review of sua sponte decisions would create 
a deterrent against inadequate and unjust proceedings before the BIA.  An 
increasing number of petitions for review creates the risk that fast decisions 
will trump the right ones.  Even if judicial review only occurs in a small 
number of cases, the threat of this review would provide the impetus for the 
BIA to ensure fair and thorough decisions if it wishes to avoid the watchful 
eye of the courts. 
328  The Plasencia 
Court recognized that when an alien is present in the United States, his 
relationship with the United States is fundamentally different from an 
immigrant who has not yet entered, and thus he is entitled to due process in 
the hearing to remove him.329  As noted in Kucana, motions to reopen for 
aliens in the United States are an important part of ensuring a “reasonable 
hearing.”330
CONCLUSION 
  Without review of sua sponte motions to reopen, aliens could 
be subject to removal orders even where exceptional circumstances exist, 
potentially leading to an outcome in conflict with the procedural due 
process required by Plasencia.  Kucana represented another step in the 
progression toward greater judicial review by allowing review of motions to 
reopen when brought by the parties.  Without any clear statutory prohibition 
from Congress, judicial review of the decisions not to reopen sua sponte 
follows from the Court’s established policy of favoring basic due process 
for aliens in immigration proceedings. 
The federal immigration apparatus is meant to provide for fair and 
speedy adjudications when an alien is subject to removal.  Although they 
are not beneficiaries of all of the Constitution’s protections, these potential 
Americans are entitled to basic due process rights when their ability to 
remain in this country is being decided.  While judicial review of BIA 
decisions certainly adds time to the process of removal, the speed of a 
decision does not make it right.  In passing IIRIRA, Congress set out certain 
categories of decisions that were not subject to review in an attempt to 
speed up the removal process.  Where Congress was silent, however, the 
strong presumption in favor of judicial review should apply. 
In Kucana, the Court applied that presumption to allow for judicial 
review of motions to reopen brought by the parties.  The Court held that an 
agency could not unilaterally declare itself insulated from judicial review 
through a regulation.  The BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte should 
be subject to the same reasoning.  Even under a lenient standard, courts can 
 
 326. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–42 (1976). 
 327. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 329. See id. 
 330. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 837 (2010). 
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and should be able to provide a meaningful review of this decision.  Judicial 
review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte would be an important tool 
for the circuit courts to ensure that proceedings before the BIA are fair.  
Using review to give potential Americans a fair decision, and not just a fast 
one, is an ideal worthy of the place that they hope to call home. 
 
